A secondary buyout is a leveraged buyout (LBO) where the buyout sponsor, who had previously taken control of a target through an LBO, sells the target firm to another private equity firm or to a financial sponsor. Secondary buyouts, as a fraction of all buyouts, have grown from 13% in the 1980s to 35% in the last five years. I find that, compared to first-time LBOs, secondary buyouts are priced at a premium that cannot be explained by the fundamentals of the target firms. The current wave of secondary buyouts does not appear to be driven by collusion on the part of private equity firms. I also find mixed evidence for the efficiency gains explanation, since the target firms show an increase in profits but a deterioration in profitability after the buyout. Instead, the evidence is most consistent with the notion that secondary buyouts are motivated by conditions in the capital markets. Specifically, firms are more likely to exit through secondary buyouts rather than through IPOs or sales to strategic buyers under certain conditions: when the equity market is 'cold', when the debt market condition is favorable, and when the selling private equity firms need to raise new funds.
Introduction
A secondary buyout is a leveraged buyout (LBO) where the buyout sponsor, who had previously taken control of a target through an LBO, sells the target firm to another private equity firm or to a financial sponsor. Secondary buyouts, as a fraction of all buyouts, have grown from 13% in the 1980s to 35% in the last five years (Pitchbook). In addition, secondary buyouts are playing an important role in the LBO recovery as a part of the greater recovery from the recent financial crisis. According to Dealogic, in the first quarter of 2010, 24 out of 60 LBO deals exited through secondary buyouts, and the two biggest LBO deals worldwide were both secondary buyouts. 1 How does one make sense of the surge in secondary buyouts in recent years? Academically, we know very little about the nature of secondary LBOs. However, some analysts have proposed a simple explanation: buyout sponsors help each other solve their investing and exiting problems; secondary buyouts have high average price tags and are often pursued at the expense of the target firms. For example, Simmons
Bedding, a company that went through five LBOs in less than two decades, is now in Chapter 11. 2 The Economist offers a similar explanation, describing secondary buyouts as "a neat solution to two of the industry's big headaches". The article further cautions, "How well investors are being served by secondary buy-outs is less clear....Once a business has been spruced up by one owner, there should be less value to be created by the next". 3 From the perspectives of these analysts, secondary buyouts do not occur for the benefit of improving the target firms. In other words, there are no operating efficiency gains from such transactions, even though secondary buyouts have high average price tags.
This view that secondary buyouts are not driven by efficiency gains in the target firms contradicts the many pro-buyout arguments made by both practitioners and researchers. Existing literature on LBOs offers a number of studies documenting the benefits that first-time buyouts provide. For example, Jensen (1989) , Lehn and Poulsen (1989) , Kaplan (1989b) , Smith (1990) , and Baker and Wruck (1991) all stress the value created in buyouts due to high leverage and high performance pay, in addition to the active monitoring of the portfolio companies' management. However, previous research focuses on public- 1 The two deals are: EQT Partners' $3.4 billion acquisition of the German publishing group Springer Science + Business Media from Cinven and Candover, completed on February 2, 2010 and Bridgepoint Capital's sale of Pets at Home, a British pet-shop chain, to Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) for 955 million pounds ($1.54 billion), completed on January 27, 2010.
2 See The New York Times, November 28, 2009. 3 See the article, "Circular logic", in the February 27, 2010 issue of The Economist.
to-private buyouts (buyouts of public corporations), which only accounted for 6.7% of all LBOs in the last twenty years (Strömberg (2008) ). In this paper, I evaluate secondary buyouts by considering two questions.
The first question is whether secondary buyouts are different from first-time buyouts. In particular, are there differences in pricing of secondary and first-time buyouts? My analyses focus on pricing for two reasons. First, analysts often claim that secondary deals are expensive. However, when evaluating deal prices, the target firms' fundamentals and other factors such as the macroeconomic condition should be taken into account. Second, deal prices not only reflect the fundamentals of the targets, but they also indicate future profitability for private equity firms. For this reason, deal prices are also directly connected with investors' future returns.
The second question I address in this paper is what motives drive secondary buyouts. The bigger question would be whether secondary buyouts benefit the target firms. However, to answer the larger question, it is necessary to determine what drives these secondary buyouts.
Existing studies on buyouts are limited by the availability of the accounting information of private firms in the U.S. I overcome this problem by using accounting variables collected from consolidated financial statements of 140 secondary buyouts and 465 first-time buyouts completed in the U.K. between 1997 and 2008. 4 The U.K. market also serves as an ideal source for such data because it is the second most active buyout market in the world, after the U.S.
To measure deal pricing, I use enterprise value (1) as a multiple of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) and (2) as a multiple of sales. To test how secondary buyouts are priced compared to first-time buyouts, I use the "comparable industry transaction method" described in Kaplan and Ruback (1995) . This method relies on estimated discounts/premiums from companies in similar industries and those involved in similar transactions. My results show that, compared to first-time buyouts, secondary buyouts are priced at a premium. Specifically, secondary deals are associated with more than 16% higher enterprise multiples. In addition, the premium cannot be explained by either the targets' characteristics, such as size, or the acquirers' abilities to borrow.
To answer the question of what motivates secondary buyouts, I examine three possible explanations:
efficiency gains, market conditions, and collusion. The theories of first-time LBOs suggest that buyouts are associated with efficiency gains, which can improve the target firms' operating performance (Jensen (1989) , Kaplan (1989b) , Baker and Wruck (1991) ). I use a three-year event window centered on the buyout year and study the changes in the targets' size, operating cash flows (before depreciation and amortization) and earnings. My results show mixed evidence in support of the efficiency gains explanation.
Relative to performance at one year prior to the buyout, EBITDA shows an industry-adjusted growth rate of 16.3%, 11.5%, and 8.4%, at one, two, and three years post-buyout, respectively. However, the target firms are not more efficient even though profits are higher. Once changes in size are taken into account, targets show significant drops in four measures of profitability: EBITDA/sales, EBITDA/fixed assets, earnings/sales, and return on assets (ROA). For example, three years after the buyout, EBITDA/fixed assets shows a drop of 28.3% relative to EBITDA/fixed assets at one year before the buyout. To better account for changes induced by marcoeconomic conditions and the organizational structures of the target firms, I match secondary buyouts with similar first-time private-to-private buyouts (buyouts of private companies). The results are also mixed. Secondary-buyout targets show better performance in generating operating cash flows but worse performance in generating earnings.
Overall, my evidence suggests that the condition of capital markets has a significant impact on secondary-buyout activities. Compared with choosing Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) or sales to strategic buyers, 5 private equity firms are more likely to exit through secondary buyouts when the equity market is 'cold'. This result suggests that secondary buyouts serve as alternative exits when other exit routes are not available. Firms are also more likely to choose secondary buyouts as exits when they need to raise new funds and when the debt market condition is favorable. Private equity firms' fundraising activities can indicate the need for liquidity as firms need to demonstrate their ability to exit portfolio companies and achieve returns when they raise new funds. A favorable debt market condition can imply that private equity firms are able to borrow more. The results are robust with respect to different measures of equity market and debt market conditions. My results also hold using Heckman's sample selection model, suggesting that the sample selection problem does not alter the conclusions drawn.
I do not find evidence for collusion on the part of private equity firms. The collusion motive predicts that active secondary-buyout sponsors trade with each other to manipulate returns. However, I do not find any discernible trade pattern among active secondary-buyout sponsors. In addition, it is often the 5 Strategic buyers are buyers who make acquisitions for specific reasons such as creating a synergy with their exiting business. An example of a strategic buyer could be a competitor or another firm in the same industry.
case that portfolio companies are being sold upstream by smaller private equity firms to bigger buyers.
Given that firms have various ways of colluding, it is important to emphasize that the pattern I show in this paper does not completely rule out collusion. However, my overall results do suggest that firms are not purposely trading poorly performing portfolio companies at above-market prices.
My findings add to the growing law and finance literature on private equity. Jensen (1986) predicts the eclipse of public corporations, and prior studies emphasize the value creation and tax benefits resulted from public-to-private buyouts, which reduce agency problems in public corporations (Baker and Wruck (1991) , Kaplan (1989a) , Smith (1990) ). However, the composition of different types of buyouts has changed over the last twenty years, and buyouts of public corporations are no longer the majority of LBOs. Between 1980 and 2007, the total number of public-to-private transactions only accounted for 6.7% of all LBOs (Strömberg (2008) ). As a result, findings from the classical studies on LBOs can no longer be applied to the current state of buyouts. Guo et al. (2009) show that the operating performance gains have decreased in recent deals. I examine secondary buyouts and find that, although targets show an increase in profits, there are no operating efficiency gains associated with these transactions, which accounted for 35% of all buyouts in the last five years.
My paper also contributes to the literature on market timing. Studies have found that firms' various decisions are related to the conditions of capital markets. For example, entrepreneurs often choose IPOs in a window of opportunity (Pagano et al. (1998) , Lerner (1994) , Lucas and McDonald (1990) ); takeovers can be related to managerial timing of market overvaluations of their firms (Shleifer and Vishny (2003) , Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) ), and firms' capital structure may be a result of the managements' effort to time the equity market (Huang and Ritter (2005) , Baker and Wurgler (2002) , Hovakimian et al. (2004) ).
By providing evidence of what determines private equity sponsors' exit decisions, I show that secondary buyouts are also responses to equity market and debt market conditions. There are currently two other working papers also examining secondary buyouts. Sousa (2010) studies the financial structure of secondary buyouts and shows that greater access to the credit market made the purchasing private equity firms willing to pay more, while selling private equity firms took advantage of these favorable debt market conditions. Bonini (2010) uses accounting information on 111 companies to show that secondary buyouts do not significantly improve the target firms' operating performance.
In addition, he argues that secondary buyouts are motivated by access to cheap financing with steadily increasing market multiples that in turn generate an incentive to flip investments between private equity funds.
My paper differs from these two papers in three ways. First, I specifically test the pricing differences between first-time and secondary buyouts. If secondary buyouts are only motivated by a favorable debt market condition, we should not observe acquisition premiums for secondary buyouts. Furthermore, whether secondary buyouts can benefit the investors does not only depend on what motivates these buyouts but also on the acquisition prices paid. Second, I use hand-collected accounting information on 140 secondary and 465 first-time buyouts to test whether secondary buyouts are motivated by operating efficiency gains. This hand-collected data further allows me to differentiate between subsidiary changes. This step is important because post-buyout consolidated financial statements might include the performance of previously acquired firms, and consequently cannot accurately describe the targets' performance changes. Third, I contribute to the literature by showing that the equity market condition, as well as the sellers' need to raise new funds, are important determinants of secondary-buyouts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses possible motives behind secondary buyouts and their empirical implications. Section 3 describes summary statistics for the data.
Section 4 examines the pricing on these secondary deals. Section 5 evaluates the validity of each motive. Section 6 concludes.
Potential Motivations for Secondary Buyouts
In this section, I discuss the three possible motives for secondary buyouts. I also discuss predictions for each motive and provide a brief review of the literature that relate to each motive.
Efficiency Gains Motive
A simple explanation for secondary buyouts is a pure efficiency-gains story: secondary buyouts occur because value can still be created in the target firms. A major portion of previous research on LBOs focuses on the value created by buyouts. Scholars often break down value creation into three sources: leverage, governance, and operational engineering. High leverage not only mitigates agency problems associated with free cash flow (Jensen (1989) , Lehn and Poulsen (1989) , Kaplan (1989b) ), but it can also provide discipline to the acquiring leveraged buyout fund (Axelson et al. (2009) ). Moreover, after the buyout, target firms benefit from governance improvements such as incentive realignment and more active monitoring (Smith (1990) , Baker and Montgomery (1994) , Baker and Wruck (1991) , Acharya et al. (2010) ). The value created through buyouts is evident in the target firms' operating performance after the buyout. Jensen (1989) , Smith (1990) , and Baker and Wruck (1991) all present evidence showing how target firms' operations are improved after the buyout. Kaplan (1989b) uses a sample of 76 management buyouts between 1980 and 1986 to show that post-buyout profits and cash flows both increase significantly. In addition, Kaplan (1989a) shows that that the tax-deductibility of interest payments is an important source of the wealth gain in buyouts. However, recent studies also show that the operating performance gains have decreased in recent deals. Guo et al. (2009) find that gains in operating performance either compare to or slightly exceed those observed for benchmark firms. Increases in industry valuation multiples and realized tax benefits from increasing leverage, while private, are each as economically important in explaining realized returns as operating performance gains are.
Critics of LBOs argue that this value creation is actually wealth transferred from other stake holders (Phalippou (2009), Perry and Williams (1994) ). However, DeAngelo et al. (1984) find that that the average going private transaction does not result in an expropriation of wealth from dispersed target shareholders.
The skepticism about how much value another set of private equity sponsors can add to the target firms is largely based on the assumption that private equity firms all use the same strategies, namely high leverage, active monitoring, and more inventive pay. While this assumption holds true in most cases, it does not take into account buyout sponsors' differing skill sets, and the synergy gains that can result from merging the resources of portfolio companies under different private equity firms.
An example of this different skill is size. Most first-time LBO targets are smaller private firms. Such companies may undergo LBOs sponsored by smaller private equity firms, but as the portfolio companies mature and expand, it may be more optimal for bigger sponsors with more resources to continue managing the target firms. In another example, differing areas of expertise could be attributed to variations in industry focus. The initial buyout sponsors can acquire or divest assets, resulting in different post-buyout core businesses for the target firms. Then, other private equity firms may be able to create synergy by combining their existing portfolio companies with secondary targets.
Following the previous research on value creation by buyout sponsors, if there is still value to be generated from the target firms, it should be apparent in the firms' operating performance. To investi-gate this motive, I follow Kaplan (1989b) in examining the effect of secondary buyouts on the targets' operating performance. Specifically, I examine changes in the targets' size, operating cash flows (before depreciation and amortization) and earnings, using a three-year event window centered on the year of secondary-buyout completion. I also use the operating performance of all private firms in the same industry in the U.K. to adjust for industry-wide changes. In addition, I compare the performance changes of secondary-buyout targets with performance changes of first-time buyouts and first-time private-to-private buyouts matched on a) industry and size and b) industry and buyout year. To support the efficiency gains motive, the target firms should show improvements in profits as well as profitability.
Market Conditions Motive
The second explanation I consider in this paper pertains to the conditions of capital markets.
This explanation suggests that secondary buyouts are simply the by-product of market conditions and private equity firms' institutional features. Jensen (1989) argues that the LBO organizational form is a long-term superior governance structure.
In reality, private equity firms also have to fulfill obligations to their investors. As a result, all buyouts are exit-focused. Exit options include taking the portfolio companies public, selling to strategic buyers, or selling to other private equity firms. 6 Exiting portfolio companies becomes even more important when buyout sponsors are confronted with liquidity needs. For example, when the buyout sponsor plans to raise a new fund, giving some investment returns back to Limited Partners (LPs) could be an important indication of the private equity firm's ability to achieve targeted returns.
On the other hand, selling to a strategic buyer or an IPO is not always possible. The literature has demonstrated that the equity market condition can drive the IPO and takeover market. Baker and Wurgler (2002) , Pagano et al. (1998) , Lerner (1994) , and Lucas and McDonald (1990) all show that more IPOs are issued when the equity market is performing well. There is also substantial evidence of industryclustering mergers (Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) , Mulherin and Boone (2000) , Harford (2005) ), as well as evidence on merger waves being correlated with economic expansion and high stock market valuations.
In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) show that overvalued firms use stocks to purchase undervalued targets. Therefore, when the equity market is 'cold', IPOs and sales to strategic buyers become less available exit options. 6 The target firms can also go bankrupt, an option healthy firms would not choose.
On the other hand, sales to other private equity firms can serve as alternatives. One distinct feature that differentiates an LBO from a typical takeover is the use of a significant amount of borrowed money. As a result, private equity firms' acquisition activities depend less on the performance of the equity market and more on the condition of the debt market. Recent research on buyouts shows that buyout activities are related to the debt market condition. For example, Kaplan and Stein (1993) investigate the LBO wave of the 1980s fuled by the junk bond market. They present evidence showing ex ante differences in the pricing and capital structure of buyouts in the late 1980s buyout wave, and their findings are consistent with an 'overheated' LBO market argument.
Moreover, due to General partners' (GPs') fee structures, 7 private equity firms have high incentives to create deals, and these incentives are increased by their ability to borrow. Axelson et al. (2010) find that credit conditions have a strong effect on the prices paid in buyouts, and that the availability of financing impacts booms and busts in the private equity market. This paper, in line with Axelson et al. (2009), shows that agency problems between private equity funds and their investors persist in this industry, and that private equity firms are prone to over-investment when the debt market condition is favorable.
Naturally, GPs' incentives to overinvest would lead to an increase in all LBOs, not just secondary buyouts. However, the supply of capital by banks could show a preference for secondary deals due to banks' information about their collateral. There is plenty of evidence indicating that information asymmetry has an impact on banks' lending activities (Kane and Malkiel (1965), Fama (1985) ). In particular, reduced information asymmetry leads to better loan terms or longer debt maturities (Wittenberg-Moerman (2007) , Ivashina (2009), Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004) , Demiroglu and James (2010) ). If banks are already familiar with the assets, secondary deals could benefit from banks' reduced risk by obtaining better loan terms or longer maturities. Moreover, practitioners often point out that secondary targets have the advantage of added certainty due to the targets' management teams having an established record in working with a high level of debt and with private equity sponsors. This added certainty lowers the risks that the next private equity firm might face. Therefore, given the ease of financing and GPs' pressure to spend capital, firms that have already gone through LBOs become ideal candidates.
On the surface, there is nothing wrong with trading assets in response to capital market conditions. 7 Private equity firms often have a 2/20 fee structure. The 2% is an annual fee that is paid to the GPs for managing the fund, and when portfolio investments are sold (or realized), GPs receive 20% of the realized capital. Any capital not invested needs to be returned to the investors. As a result, GPs must forgo management fees on the uninvested capital. In addition, a fund with leftover capital can trigger investors doubts about the private equity firm's ability to generate returns. This outcome consequently impacts the private equity firm's future fundraising ability.
After all, the institutional features of private equity firms dictates that their buyout specialists must acquire targets, and also that they have to exit their portfolio companies. However, this motivation draws attention to several problems. First, by exiting through secondary buyouts, unnecessary costs are generated by the institutional features of private equity. Huge fees of private equity firms, investment banks, and lawyers are produced from each sale, and consequently, a part of the ultimate owners' value that is associated with the portfolio companies is eroded. Second, successful LBO targets are most often characterized by strong, non-cyclical, and stable cash flows with a lot of unused borrowing capacity. However, buyouts of firms that are not ideal LBO candidates can be carried out, as GPs' incentive to invest increases with their ability to borrow. As GPs' incentive to do deals increases, the incentive to do good deals decreases. In the absence of performance improvements, pursuing secondary buyouts adds to the problem of too much money chasing too few deals (Kaplan and Stein (1993) ).
To test whether secondary buyouts are driven by the conditions of capital markets, I examine how sellers' exit decisions vary with market conditions. Specifically, I estimate the probability of a firm exiting through a secondary buyout, compared to other alternatives, when the equity market condition and the debt market condition varies. In addition, I use a fundraising indicator variable to proxy for the seller's need for liquidity. If secondary buyouts are responses to capital market conditions, the following three conditions should be associated with more secondary buyouts: a 'cold' equity market, a favorable debt market, and when private equity firms need to raise new funds.
Collusion Motive
Finally, I consider collusion on the part of private equity firms. Although LBOs are often praised for alleviating agency problems for public corporations, the combination of private equity firms acting as agents of investors while having the freedom to do deals, naturally gives rise to a divergence of interests between buyout specialists and their investors, and and the secondary-buyout market seems like a perfect setup for collusion: portfolio companies are being traded among buyout sponsors; there are a limited number of players in the private equity market; and the industry lacks transparency and regulation. All these factors could conjoin to create a favorable environment for collusion on the part of private equity firms.
Although private equity firms have been recently scrutinized for collusion, the actual practice of collusion is difficult to prove. The concern with collusion in secondary buyouts is that private equity firms are exchanging assets at above-market prices so as to artificially boost returns. This is very different from the possible collusion cases we have seen in club deals, where consortiums are associated with lower deal prices. Officer et al. (2010) examine the pricing and characteristics of club deals formed by private equity firms in recent years. They document that target shareholders receive significantly less in club deals as compared with sole-sponsored LBOs. While private equity firms' investors can generally benefit from lower purchasing prices in club deals, possible collusion in secondary buyouts can be pursued at the expense of both the investors and the target firms.
From the investors' perspective, the higher the purchase price, the less profit is received with the sale of the portfolio company. In addition, if secondary buyouts are used as means of exiting poorly performing portfolio companies, acquisitions of such firms would ultimately harm the acquirers' investors.
Moreover, buyouts of poorly performing targets can lead to greater problems. Not all firms can sustain the amount of debt incurred in an LBO transaction. If prices are higher at each transaction point, it is very likely that the firm's debt burden would correspondingly increase, consequently pushing the poorly performing firm closer to financial distress. As previously mentioned, the five buyouts of Simmons Bedding is one such case. Each buyout had a higher purchase price, added more debt to the firm, and failed to improve the operating performance. The company eventually filed for Chapter 11. 8 One direct way to evaluate whether private equity firms are colluding to trade troubled assets is to examine who the active buyers and sellers are in this market, and whether there are trade patterns among the active buyers. However, it is important to emphasize that the absence of a trade pattern cannot completely rule out the possibility of collusion.
Data and Sample Statistics
Existing studies on LBOs are limited by data availability. I overcome this problem by focusing my sample on the U.K. market. There are three advantages associated with a sample of U.K. targets. First, accounting data is needed to examine the motives for secondary buyouts. However, private firms in the U.S. do not disclose annual financial reports. Although accounting information is available for private U.S. firms if they have outstanding public debt, the number of firms that went through a secondary LBO 8 The New York Times, November 28, 2009. and that also have public debt outstanding is approximately 30, and a sample of that size would put restrictions on the empirical anlyses needed to test different motivations. In contrast, private firms in the U.K. are required to submit an annual financial report. Therefore, studying U.K. firms allows for a much larger sample. Second, the U.K. has the second most active LBO market in the world, after the U.S., and the U.K. market is still growing in size. For instance, the second biggest LBO deal in the first quarter of 2010 involves a U.K. target. Therefore, the U.K. market is an ideal source for studying secondary buyouts. Third, a sample made up of U.K. targets does not restrict the scope of my study. Cross-border acquisitions are common for private equity firms, and so a sample of U.K. firms would include buyout sponsors from the U.S. as well as from other parts of Europe. Consequently, investors beyond the U.K. Since the only accounting information collected is for firms with consolidated financial statements, one concern is whether the sample of 140 firms are representative of the overall secondary-buyout sample.
Therefore, I compare the industry distribution and exit routes for my sample of firms with consolidated statements to the industry distribution and exit routes for all secondary buyouts. Although this comparison does not completely address the sample selection problem, it reduces the concern that firms with consolidated statements are more concentrated in certain industries, and that results could be driven by those firms being more or less successful than the rest of the secondary-buyout targets. Panel C of Table 1 shows the exit routes as of February, 2010 for all secondary buyouts and the secondary-buyout targets with consolidated financial statements. Although the percentage of firms sold to strategic buyers and other private equity firms is higher for secondary buyouts with consolidated statements, both samples indicate that sales to strategic buyers and secondary buyouts are the two most common exit routes. 9.3% of the overall secondary-buyout sample were sold to strategic buyers, while 20% of secondary-buyout targets with consolidated statements were sold to strategic buyers; 7.6% of all secondary buyouts exited through another buyout, while 15.7% of the secondary-buyout targets with consolidated statements were sold again to private equity firms. Table 2 presents the mean, median, and standard deviation of the firm-specific variables used in my analyses. There are considerable variations between the mean and the median of each variable, due to the nature of the firms in my sample, which includes small private firms as well as huge, formerly public corporations. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is performed to test the median difference between first-time and secondary LBOs. As shown in Table 2 , secondary-buyout targets are considerably larger firms. For the full year prior to the buyout, the median value of the fixed assets for the secondary group is £15.67m, compared to £2.02m for the first-time buyout group. The median pre-buyout EBITDA of secondary LBOs is also significantly higher than the median pre-buyout EBITDA of first-time LBOs. The two groups show a difference of £3.2m, which is significant at the 1% level. However, the two profitability ratios show that secondary buyouts generate smaller profit margins and a smaller return on assets (ROA).
This result is partially due to secondary-buyout targets having higher leverage and consequently more interest payments.
[Insert table 2]
Finally, other variables used in the subsequent analyses are collected from various sources. Industry IPO volume, which is a proxy for the equity market condition, is collected from SDC. Information on leveraged loans is from Thompson Reuters' Datastream. I construct information related to private equity sponsors' funds, such as size, cash contribution by investors, and investment periods from information provided by Preqin. Preqin reports data on 9,523 private equity funds; the database covers about 70% of all buyouts and venture capital raised by private equity firms. The accounting information of private firms, which I use to adjust for industry performance for the buyouts in my sample, is collected from Amadeus.
Are Secondary Buyouts Priced Higher?
Deal characteristics contain many aspects ranging from the deal structure to deal pricing. The first objective of this paper is to document the pricing of secondary buyouts as part of the analysis on whether secondary buyouts are different from first-time buyouts. Analysts who caution investors often describe secondary buyouts as expensive deals. Clearly, the higher the purchase price, the lower the profit investors would receive upon the sale of the firm, all else equal. Moreover, deal prices should reflect the fundamental values of the target firms. In the case of LBOs, higher prices should also reflect the future profitability of the target firms.
Since private and public firms rely on different financing sources, the deal pricing of first-time LBO targets is used as a benchmark. And while the mergers & acquisitions literature often focuses on premiums paid to target shareholders, a sample of private firms does not allow for the estimation of return-based measures. Hence, I rely on two pricing measures typically used by the private equity industry: enterprise value as multiples of 1) sales and 2) EBITDA at one year prior to the buyout. Enterprise value is estimated as deal value excluding assumed liabilities plus total debt minus cash. Table 3 is an indicator variable that equals one if the buyout is a secondary buyout, and zero if the buyout is a public-to-private or private-to-private buyout. The log of total assets is used to proxy for the targets' size. Demiroglu and James (2010) show that a better reputation allows private equity firms to obtain favorable financing from banks, permitting them to pay lower bank and institutional loan spreads and have longer loan maturities. This access to favorable financing terms might in turn impact the prices that private equity firms pay. Therefore, I control for the buyers' reputation by using an indicator variable. PE buyer reputation equals one if the private equity acquirer is listed on the PEI 50 index, published by Private Equity International Magazine (PEI). This index ranks and lists the 50 largest private equity firms in the world. PE buyer reputation equals zero if the firm is not listed on PEI 50 index. Furthermore, Axelson et al. (2010) show that a favorable debt market condition can drive higher LBO deal prices. Hence, I also control for the condition of the debt market, for which the size of the high-yield market is a proxy. The last explanatory variable, Secondary*PE buyer reputation, is an interaction variable between the secondary buyout indicator variable and the private equity buyer's reputation indicator variable.
[Insert table 3]
Columns (1) to (6) of Table 3 show that when pricing is measured as EV/EBITDA, secondary buyouts are associated with a premium of approximately 16%. The results are significant at the 10% level when clustered by year and at the 1% level when clustered by industry. Columns (7) to (12) show that when EV/Sales is used as a measure of deal pricing, the premium is even higher; it is significant at the 1% level in all regressions. In addition, the coefficient estimate for PE buyer reputation in Column 11 is 28.5% and significant at the 5% level. This result implies that holding everything else equal, bigger private equity firms pay 28.5% more when pricing is measured by enterprise value as a multiple of sales. However, once the interaction term between the buyer's reputation and secondary buyout is taken into account, the total effect of PE buyer reputation is -0.088, suggesting that more well-known private equity firms pay less for secondary buyouts. The results presented in this table also suggests that the condition of the debt market and the size of targets are not a factor in deal pricing. Kaplan and Ruback (1995) show that comparable methods provide more accurate estimations of valuation. Therefore, I also use the "comparable industry transaction method" described in Kaplan and Ruback (1995) to analyze pricing of secondary buyouts. This method uses multiples calculated from portfolios of firms in the same industry involved in similar transactions. Specifically, for each secondary and first-time buyout in my sample, I form a matching portfolio of non-private-equity-sponsored deals in the same Fama-French 10 industry in the U.K. and compute the average multiple for that portfolio. Then I calculate the percent difference between enterprise value as multiples of sales or as multiples of EBITDA for each private-equity-sponsored deal and the comparable multiple for the matching portfolio. Finally I compare the resulting percent differences across secondary and first-time buyouts. Table 4 , the independent variable of interest is the secondary buyout indicator variable. In Panel A, portfolios are matched based on whether the deal announcement dates fall within a three-year window centered on the announcement date of the LBO. In both specifications, based on either EBITDA or sales, the estimated coefficients for the secondary indicator variable are consistent with those in Table 3 : they are all significantly positive, indicating a premium for secondary buyouts compared to first-time buyouts. Size is also significant, although the estimates show opposite effects on EV/EBITDA and EV/Sales. Unlike the results shown in Table 3 , estimates in this table show that the size of the high-yield market is associated with higher enterprise value as multiples of sales. This results suggests that greater access to the credit market also leads to higher EV/Sales. This is consistent with findings in Axelson et al. (2010) , showing that favorable debt market conditions can lead to higher deal pricing. To eliminate the possibility that the results shown in Panel A are driven by information not available at the time of buyout, I further match portfolio firms based on a three-year window preceding the announcement date of a buyout. Panel B of Table 4 presents the results, which are consistent with those in Panel A.
Overall, the results show that secondary buyouts are priced at a premium, even controlling for the fundamentals of the target firms, market conditions, and private equity firms' ability to borrow. With higher purchasing prices, the acquirers' investors can only benefit if the targets are sold for even higher prices. In addition, in a perfect world, higher prices should reflect the future value of the target firms. In other words, higher prices would be best explained by the expected profits that the target firms are able to generate.
Possible Explanations for Secondary Buyouts
The previous section established that secondary deals are priced higher than similar first-time buyouts. In this section, I attempt to explain the current secondary-buyout trend by examining three possible motives: 1) the efficiency gains motive, 2) the capital market conditions explanation, and 3) the collusion motive.
The Efficiency Gains motive
The argument that secondary buyouts have limited upside potential relies on the assumption that private equity firms employ similar strategies. While the assumption is true for most buyouts, sponsors have different skill sets, and combining the portfolio companies of different private equity firms may result in synergy creation. Therefore, one explanation for secondary buyouts is that there is still value to be created in the target firms, and hence, private equity firms are willing to pay high prices for them.
Following Kaplan (1989b) , I indirectly examine value creation by analyzing the effect of buyouts on targets' operating performance. If more value is to be generated, target firms should experience operating performance gains. I focus on changes in four variables-1) fixed assets, 2) sales, 3) operating cash flow (before depreciation and amortization), and 4) earnings. Because mergers and acquisitions are often associated with writeups of firms' assets, fixed assets, instead of total assets, are used to mitigate the impact of accounting writeups. EBITDA is measured in three ways: in levels, as a fraction of annual sales, and as a fraction of fixed assets; earnings are measured as a fraction of sales (profit margin) and as a fraction of total assets (ROA).
I divide my full sample of 140 secondary buyouts into two categories: 'Same subsidiary' and 'Different subsidiaries', based on whether the portfolio company had subsidiary changes from one full fiscal year prior to the buyout to one full year after. Due to inaccurate comparisons, the 'Different subsidiaries' group is excluded from all subsequent analyses of the firms' operating performance changes (for details see Appendix I). Figure 1 shows the industry-adjusted medians of each variable for the 'Same Subsidiaries' sample within a three-year event window centered on the buyout year. The reason for using the median instead of the mean is to reduce the impact of outliers. To control for industry-wide changes, my analyses also present the industry-adjusted median changes. For each variable, the industry-adjusted change is computed by subtracting the median of all private firms in the U.K. in the same Fama-French 10 industry. Figure 1 shows the industry-adjusted median values of each variable. As Figure 1 indicates, EBITDA grows slightly after the buyout. However, fixed assets and sales increase significantly after the buyout.
As a result, EBITDA as a fraction of fixed assets and as a fraction of total sales decrease after the buyout.
Profit margin and ROA show similar results.
[Insert figure 1] Table 5 reports the median percentage changes in the targets' operating performance from three years prior to the buyout to three years after it. Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are performed to test whether the percentage changes are significantly different from zero. 1, 2, and 3 each represent one, two, and three full fiscal years prior to or after the buyout, indicated by '-' and '+' signs. 'At year -1' shows the median value of each variable one full fiscal year prior to the buyout. As previously mentioned, the 46 firms with different subsidiaries are excluded from all subsequent analyses of the effect of buyouts on firms' operating performance.
[Insert table 5]
Panel A of Table 5 shows that firms' operating cash flow grows significantly before the buyout. In addition, compared to one year before the buyout, firms' EBITDA grows at a rate of 16.3%, 13.9%, and 19.3%, at, respectively, one, two, and three years afterwards. Industry-adjusted percentage changes also show a growth of 16.5%, 11.5%, and 8.4%, although the growth in the second and third years after the buyout is not significant. Overall, changes in EBITDA suggest that the firms' profits increase after the buyout.
However, increases in profits can be achieved through two channels. The first is by improving the company so that the firm can run more efficiently; the second is by expanding the firm through acquisitions, which provide artificial boosts to the firms' sales. The size measures and the other profitability measures shown in Panel A suggest that the increases in EBITDA are not achieved through efficiency, as suggested by previous literature. Before the buyout, the firms' sales and fixed assets both grow significantly, However, after the buyout, sales and fixed assets show significant growth rates that are higher than the pre-buyout growth rate. Industry-adjusted median percentage changes indicate that, relative to sales at one year prior to the buyout, at one, two, and three years after the buyout, sales grow significantly by 13%, 20.4%, and 38.2%, respectively. In addition, once scaled by the size of the firm, the firms' EBITDA shows significant drops. For example, EBITDA/fixed assets 'At year -1' shows that the pre-buyout EBITDA/fixed assets is 0.34, but that this number dropped by almost half in the second year after the buyout. The two profitability measures involving earnings show similar results: the target firms experience a significant decrease in profitability once changes in sales and assets are taken into account.
Because targets show a decline in profitability when scaled by size, I further check to ensure that the results are not due to decreasing economies of scale. As a simple test of decreasing economies of scale, I divide my sample of 'Same subsidiary' firms to small and big firms. The median value of total assets one year before the buyout is used as the cutoff point for small and big firms. Panel B of Table 5 presents the results. As this panel shows, operating cash flows and profitability measures are inconsistent with decreasing economies of scale. Both small and big firms show drops in EBITDA/fixed assets, EBITDA/sales, earnings/sales, and ROA. Overall, Table 5 presents a consistent picture: firms' operating profit increases but not relative to the size of the firm. This result imply that although profits go up after the buyout, the target firms' efficiency does not.
Buyouts can induce dramatic changes in firms' organizational structures, and buyouts targets' capital structure and governance have distinctive features which can impact a firms' performance. Furthermore, I find that secondary buyouts are priced at a premium compared to first-time buyouts. Therefore, for a better performance comparison, I also use first-time buyouts as the benchmark group. Table 6 shows the differences in operating performance changes between secondary and first-time buyouts. Differences are computed as the median percentage changes in secondary targets from year i to year j minus the median percentage changes in corresponding first-time targets. Therefore, a positive number indicates a better performance of secondary targets, and a negative number implies the opposite. Panel A presents the comparison results between secondary targets and the full sample of 465 first-time targets, including public-to-private and private-to-private buyouts. The industry-adjusted results suggest that prior to the buyout, there are no significant differences in EBITDA between the two groups. After the buyout, secondary buyouts generate higher EBITDA, both in levels and as a fraction of the size of the firm. However, changes in the two profitability ratios do not show significant differences between the two groups.
[Insert table 6]
Previous studies largely focus on public-to-private deals, and the benefits of buyouts of public corporations come from resolving firms' agency problems. The incentives of private-to-private deals are different since private firms do not face the same agency problems as public corporations (Chung (2009) Table 2 , secondary buyouts have significantly higher pre-buyout fixed assets and sales. Hence, a replaced match would result in secondary-buyout targets being matched with much smaller firms. Overall, the results from matching based on industry and size show that secondary-buyout targets and first-time private-to-private targets in the same industry and of similar size do not show significant differences in performance changes both before and after the buyout.
Secondary buyouts became much more popular in the latter part of this decade. Variations in macroeconomic conditions might drive the differences of performance changes between secondary and first-time buyouts. Therefore, I also match secondary buyouts with first-time private-to-private deals based on buyout year and industry. The results show mixed evidence. Although changes in EBITDA do not differ between the two matched groups, secondary-buyout targets do significantly better when the performance is scaled by fixed assets. In contrast, the profit margin and ROA show that when scaled by size, first-time buyouts are more profitable. 11
Overall, the figures and tables in this section show mixed evidence in support of the efficiency gains motivation. Secondary-buyout targets have higher profits after the buyouts. However, these target firms are not more efficient, as is evident from the drop of profitability ratios and EBITDA when scaled by the size of the firm. In light of the literature's emphasis on value creation, these results suggests that secondary buyouts do not create more value in terms of improving the efficiency of the target firms.
On the other hand, secondary-buyout targets have slightly higher profits compared to similar first-time private-to-private deals. (1) through (4) in Table 7 report results from the probit regressions. The dependent variable equals one if the firm exited through a secondary buyout, zero if the firm exited through an IPO or was sold to a strategic buyer. I use seven explanatory variables to control for market conditions, firm, seller, and 11 Table 2 indicates that secondary-buyout targets have significantly higher leverage. Therefore, a lower profit margin and ROA could be attributed to secondary buyouts having higher leverage. To exclude the impact from leverage, I also measured the two profitability ratios by (Earnings + Interest Paid)/Sales and (Earnings + Interest Paid)/Total Assets. Although the results show smaller differences, secondary buyouts still significantly underperform first-time private-to-private buyouts. industry characteristics. Industry IPO volume in the U.K. in the year of exit is used as a proxy for equity market conditions. I use the size of the high-yield market in the year of exit to measure whether the debt market is favorable. A larger high-yield market indicates that firms are able to borrow more, and hence, a more favorable debt market condition. To measure the selling private equity firms' need for liquidity, I construct an indicator variable based on the seller's fundraising event within two years of exiting the portfolio company, since the typical fundraising period for private equity firms is two years. Seller's fundraising in the next two years equals one if the selling private equity firm raised a new fund within two years of exiting the target firm, zero otherwise. The other control variables are the size of the target firms, measured by the log of total assets; profitability, measured by EBITDA/fixed assets; and industry sales growth, measured by the average sales growth of firms in the same industry in the U.K. Table 7 shows that better equity market conditions are significantly negatively correlated with secondarybuyout exits. The estimated marginal effect for Industry IPO volume in Column (1) is approximately -0.096 and significant at the 5% level. This shows that an increase in one unit of industry IPO volume significantly decreases the likelihood of firms choosing secondary buyouts by 9.6%. The debt market condition, on the other hand, is significantly positively associated with the probability of firms exiting through secondary buyouts. Estimates of marginal effects for High-yield market sizein both Column (2) and Column (4) indicate that greater borrowing ability is associated with a higher number of secondary buyouts. For example, the estimated marginal effect in Column (2) implies that an one unit increase in the size of the high-yield market increases secondary buyouts by 8.5%. Raising new funds is also positively related to a firm's decision to exit through a secondary buyouts. When private equity firms need to raise new funds, they are under more pressure to exit, so as to show that they are capable of achieving returns.
The Capital Market Conditions Motive

[Insert table 7]
The estimates for the fundraising indicator variable is consistent with the idea that GPs need to demonstrate their ability to exit their portfolio firms. Moreover, once the interaction of Industry IPO volume and Seller's fundraising activities in the next two years are taken into account, the total effect of Industry IPO volume is -0.218, suggesting that an increase in industry IPO volume decreases the probability of firms exiting through secondary buyouts by 21.8%. Norton et al. (2004) point out that estimating the interaction terms in nonlinear models can be problematic. Therefore, I also estimate the corrected interaction term, following their suggestions. However, the result is insignificant.
Estimates from probit regressions also show that size is significantly related to firms exiting through secondary buyouts, with bigger firms are more likely to exit through secondary buyouts. However, the targets' profitability, measured by EBITDA/fixed assets, is not related to secondary buyouts, while industry sales growth is negatively associated with secondary buyouts.
The obvious problem in using probit estimation is the issue of selection, which can lead to inconsistent estimates. Exit routes can only be identified if the firm has exited. Roughly 300 firms in my sample had not exited as of February 2010. To address this problem, I follow Heckman (1979) and use a Heckman selection model, in which I first predict which firms are more likely to exit, and then estimate the probability of exiting through secondary buyouts.
Selection equation:
Observed = PE seller reputation + Holding period + EBITDA growth
Treatment equation:
Exit = Industry IPO volume + High-yield market size + Seller's fundraising in the next two years + Industry IPO volume*Seller's fundraising + Size + EBITDA/fixed assets + Industry sales growth
In the first stage, I include three variables that are more likely to be associated with firms' probability of exiting: PE seller reputation, Holding period, and EBITDA growth as of three years after the buyout.
Because more successful private equity firms are more likely to be able to exit their investments, PE seller reputation is an indicator variable that equals one if the seller is one of the largest 50 private equity firms world-wide, zero otherwise. Holding period is the number of months that the portfolio company has been held. If the firm has not exited, the holding period is calculated as of February, 2010. A longer holding period suggests that a private equity firm is more likely to exit. However, holding periods should not affect a firm's decision about which exit path to choose. The third variable I control for in the selection equation is the targets' EBITDA growth as of three years after the buyout, as more profitable firms are also more likely to exit.
The results estimated by using the Heckman selection model are similar to those obtained by probit regressions. Industry IPO volume is significantly negatively associated with exiting through secondary buyouts while high-yield market size and Seller's fundarising in the next two years are both positively related to the probability of secondary buyouts. In addition, the estimated ρ, which is the correlation between the error term for the selection and the treatment equation, is significantly different from zero.
This indicates that the concern about sample selection is justified.
To further verify the robustness of the results, I use alternative measures to proxy for market conditions. Previous studies have found that the industry market-to-book ratio can determine equity market activities. Therefore, I use the industry market-to-book ratio as an alternative measure of the equity market condition. A bigger market-to-book ratio would indicate a 'hot' equity market. To proxy for the debt market condition, I follow Axelson et al. (2010) and use the spread between interest rates of high-yield loans and the six month LIBOR rate. Table 7 . A higher spread of high-yield loans and the private equity sellers' fundraising events are both positively related to the probability of secondary buyouts. Although probit regressions show that Industry Market-to-Book is not significantly correlated with a firm's decision to exit through a secondary buyout, the variable shows a negative effect. In addition, due to sample selection, the Heckman's selection model should be used to adjust for biased estimations. After correcting the selection problem, Industry Market-to-Book shows a negative coefficient estimate that is significant at the 1% level. Also consistent with Table 7 , this table shows that more reputable sellers and firms with higher EBITDA growth are also more likely to exit their portfolio companies.
In short, the results are consistent with the notion that capital market conditions are associated with the number of secondary buyouts. In addition, private equity sponsors' fundraising activities are also related to their decision to exit through secondary buyouts.
The Collusion Motive
The last motivation I examine is the possibility of collusion on the part of private equity firms.
Private equity firms that act as agents of investors while maintaining the freedom to do deals naturally creates a divergence of interest between private equity firms and their investors. Collusion is a possibility, as many factors in the buyout market seem to create an ideal environment for such an activity. For instance, the private equity industry is less regulated compared to other industries such as mutual funds.
Moreover, there is very little transparency in buyout transactions. Information about firm-level cash flows or about the funds to which the portfolio companies belong are usually not released to the public. The concern with collusion, in the case of secondary buyouts, is that in pursuing a strategy of trading assets at high prices, troubled portfolio companies in particular, can temporarily boost returns but ultimately harm both their investors and the portfolio companies.
The collusion motive predicts that active secondary-buyout sponsors trade more often with each other. Therefore, one way to test whether collusion is a factor is to directly investigate the buyout patterns of active players in the secondary LBO market. Table 9 provides data on transactions sponsored by major players in the secondary-buyout market.
[Insert table 9]
Panel A of Table 9 lists the top sellers and acquirers of secondary LBO targets. This panel only shows the most active 27 firms. PEI50 indicates the firm's ranking in the PEI 50 index. A dash '-' means that the firm is not ranked as one of the top 50 private equity firms in the world. This list of sellers and buyers provides some insights as to whether private equity firms are trading portfolio companies. A glance at the top sellers' list tells us that the secondary-buyout market is not dominated by a few sellers. With the exception of 3i Group, who exited 36 deals through secondary LBOs, most private equity firms only exited two or three deals through secondary buyouts. The rest of these sellers appear to be smaller private equity firms who only sold one or two portfolio companies during the sample period of 1997 to 2008 (not shown in the table). Acquirers' activities, on the other hand, are much more dominated by a few private equity firms; the total number of secondary buyouts sponsored by the top five acquirers exceeds 100. Table 9 is a cross-participation matrix that clearly maps out trade patterns, if any are present among the most active acquirers in this market. The vertical axis lists those private equity firms as buyers, and the horizontal line lists the same firms as sellers. A dash '-' in this matrix indicates that no deal was carried out between the two parties. Zero, on the other hand, means that one private equity firm did not acquire any target from the other party, but that at least one transaction occurred in the other direction. For example, the numbers under Bridgepoint Capital and Bank of Scotland show that Bridgepoint Capital did not acquire a portfolio company from Bank of Scotland. However, Bank of Scotland was the acquirer in one deal with Bridgepoint Capital. As shown in this panel, the total number of two-way deals, where two private equity firms have acquired at least one target from each other, is only six. Therefore, there does not appear to be any discernible trade pattern among the top acquirers in the secondary-buyout market. 12 Overall, this panel shows that active acquirers in the secondary-buyout market are not likely to more frequently trade with each other than they are with other players in this market. 13 Both panels in this table reveal suggestions that are inconsistent with the notion that private equity firms are trading assets. The number of sellers in the secondary-buyout market is considerably more than the number of acquirers, and active acquirers do not excessively trade with each other. Rather, it is often the case that bigger private equity firms acquire portfolio companies from smaller sponsors.
Panel B of
Due to the difficulty of detecting collusion. I need to emphasize that an absence of trade patterns can not completely rule out the possibility of collusion. Private equity firms have ways of paying each other off other than trading assets. For example, many of the buyouts are sponsored by a bank's private equity arm. Collusion, in this case, might lead to a trade-partner private equity firm receiving more favorable financing from the parent bank instead. I do not specifically test such possibilities in this paper.
However, the major concern with collusion is that private equity firms are trading poorly performing portfolio companies, pushing those companies closer to financial distress; results from this paper show that manipulating bad assets by trading with other private equity firms is unlikely.
Conclusion
The rise of secondary buyouts is a recent development in the buyout market, and one that has raised some analysts' suspicions about the motives behind such transactions. In this paper, I attempt to shed light on the nature of secondary buyouts by 1) documenting the pricing of secondary deals in comparison to first-time LBOs, and 2) providing evidence concerning three possible explanations for secondary buyouts.
Studies of buyouts are limited by the availability of fund-level data and the target firms' accounting information after the buyout. Focusing on the U.K. market allows me to obtain accounting information for 140 secondary buyouts and 465 first-time buyouts. I find that secondary-buyout targets are priced higher than first-time LBO targets are, even after controlling for the fundamentals of the target firms and the buyer's ability to borrow.
To determine what are the motives behind secondary buyouts, I investigate the following three po-tential explanations: 1) the pure efficiency gains that result from transferring assets to another firm, 2) the market conditions and the sellers' need to demonstrate returns, and 3) collusion on the part of private equity firms to trade assets and temporarily boost returns.
The classical theories of LBOs emphasize the value creation inherited in buyouts and show that firsttime LBOs prompt operating performance gains. However, I find mixed results for the efficiency gains motivation. Although post-buyout accounting information show that the target firms experience increases in profits, measured by the percentage changes in EBITDA, the firms' profitability decreases, as evident in drops of EBITDA/sales, EBITDA/fixed assets, earnings/sales, and ROA. On the other hand, compared to matched first-time buyouts, secondary-buy targets perform better in generating cash flows but worse in generating earnings.
Collusion also appears to be an unlikely explanation. A cross-participation matrix reveals that there is no discernible trade pattern among the most active acquirers in the secondary-buyout market. Moreover, I find that portfolio companies are being sold upstream by smaller private equity firms to bigger buyers.
Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow for further testing of the collusion motive. While the findings cannot completely rule out the possibility of collusion, my results suggest that buyout sponsors are not trading troubled assets in the secondary market.
My overall finding is most consistent with the capital market conditions motive. Results from probit regressions show that sellers are more likely to exit through secondary buyouts when the equity market condition is 'cold', measured by industry IPO volume; when the debt market condition is favorable, suggesting buyers' greater ability to borrow, and when private equity firms need to raise new funds to demonstrate their ability to achieve returns. These findings are robust to the sample selection problem and alternative measures of market conditions. The composition of buyouts has changed over the years. By documenting the pricing premium and identifying the motives that drive secondary buyouts, this paper provides new evidence on the current state of LBOs and why more recent deals seem to create less value. The table shows the distribution of buyouts in the U.K. Panel A reports the number of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) completed in the U.K. between 1997 and 2008. All LBOs represents the total number of completed LBOs, where the acquirer sought more than 50% of the target firm's shares. Secondary LBOs is the total number of secondary buyouts identified from Zephyr. An LBO is classified as a secondary buyout if the buyer and the seller are both private equity firms or financial sponsors, and if a more than 50% stake was acquired. Percentage shows the number of secondary buyouts as a percentage of all LBOs in a year. Panel B reports the industry distribution of secondary buyouts as well as all buyouts. Secondary (Consolidated) shows the industry distribution of secondary-buyout targets with consolidated financial statements. Industries are categorized according to the Fama-French 10 industry classification, based on the target firm's primary businesses. The Others industry includes firms which operate in mines, construction, building material, transportation, hotels, bus services, entertainment, and finance. The Non-classified group contains firms without a Fama-French 10 industry classification. The table contains the number of observations, mean, median, and standard deviation (Std Dev.) of all the firm-specific variables used in the subsequent analyses. The secondary buyout sample includes all secondary buyouts (identified from Zephyr) with consolidated financial statements. The first-time LBO sample contains public-to-private and private-to-private buyouts with consolidated financial statements. The summary statistics for pre-buyout variables are reported as of one full fiscal year before the buyout. Diff (Secondary -First-time) is the median difference computed by subtracting the median value of first-time LBOs from the median value of secondary LBOs. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is performed for the difference between secondary and first-time LBOs. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The table shows results from OLS regressions where the dependent variables are enterprise value as multiples of EBITDA (EV/EBITDA) and enterprise value as multiples of sales (EV/Sales). Firms with negative EBITDA at one year prior to the buyout are removed in all regressions for EV/EBITDA. Secondary is an indicator variable that equals one if the buyout is a secondary buyout and zero if the buyout is a public-to-private or private-to-private buyout. Size is the log of total assets at one full fiscal year prior to the buyout. PE buyer reputation is an indicator variable that equals one if the private equity acquirer belongs to the PEI 50 index, which lists the world's 50 largest private equity firms, and zero otherwise. High-yield market size at the time of buyout is used to proxy for debt market conditions; Secondary*PE buyer reputation is an interaction term between Secondary and PE buyer reputation. Odd columns present results clustered by year, while even columns show results clustered by industry. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The table presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variables are acquisition discounts or premiums for buyouts based on enterprise value as multiples of EBITDA (EV/EBITDA Difference) and as multiples of sales (EV/Sales Difference). Firms with negative EBITDA at one year prior to acquisitions are removed from all regressions involving EV/EBITDA. The acquisition discount or premium is calculated as the percent difference between a deal multiple for an LBO and the average deal multiple for a portfolio of non-private-equity-sponsored acquisitions of private firms in the same industry in the U.K. Whether firms are in the same industry is determined by the Fama-French 10 industry classification. Matched firms are allowed to enter multiple portfolios. In Panel A, each matched portfolio contains deals that are announced within a three-year window centered on the announcement dates of LBOs in my sample. In Panel B, the matching window is a three-year window immediately preceding the announcement dates of LBOs in my sample. All variables are defined in Table 3 . All results are clustered by year. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Three-year window centered on deal announcement The table presents the median percentage changes and the industry-adjusted median percentage changes in operating performance from year i to year j for secondary-buyout targets with consolidated financial statements. Industry-adjusted percentage change is computed as the change for the buyout target minus the median value for a sample of private firms in the same industry in the U.K. for a given period. Whether firms operate in the same industry is determined according to the Fama-French 10 industry classification. Years 1, 2, and 3 each represent the first, second, or third full fiscal year before (indicated by '-') or after (indicated by '+') the year of buyout completion. 'Level at -1' indicates the median value at one full fiscal year prior to the year of buyout completion. The full sample contains 140 secondary-buyout targets with consolidated financial statements before and after the buyout. The full sample is further divided to 'Same subsidiary' and 'Different subsidiaries' based on subsidiary changes within a one-year window centered on the buyout year. The 'Different subsidiaries' group is excluded from all subsequent analyses on the target firms' operating performance (details provided in Appendix I). Panel A shows results for firms whose subsidiaries did not change from one full fiscal year before the completion of the buyout to one full fiscal year after. Panel B shows the percentage changes for small and big firms within the 'Same subsidiary' group. The median value of total assets from one full year prior to the buyout is used as the cutoff point for 'Big' and 'Small'. Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are performed to test whether the percentage changes are significantly different from zero. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 0.7% 0.6%** -1.8%*** -4.4%*** -4.1%*** 1.2%* 1.3%*** -5.5%*** -9.2%*** -6.4%*** Industry-adjusted change 0.2% 0.2% -2.2%*** -7.2%*** -6.7%*** 1.1% 0.9% -5.9%*** -13.1%*** -9.7%*** ROA At year -1 0.12 At year -1 0.08 Median change 1.1% 1.8%** -7.1%*** -9.9%*** -10.7%*** 1.1%** 1.3%*** -3.1%*** -5.0%*** -4.9%*** Industry-adjusted change 1.5% 0.7% -7.9%*** -14.0%*** -15.8%*** 1.1%* 0.5% -7.4%*** -14.2%*** -17.1%*** The table shows the differences in median changes and industry-adjusted median changes in operating performance for secondary ('Same subsidiary') and first-time buyouts. Differences are computed as the changes for secondary targets from year i to year j minus the changes for first-time targets from corresponding years. A positive number indicates that the change for secondary targets is bigger than it is for first-time targets. Panel A presents the difference between secondary buyouts and the full sample of first-time buyouts, which include public-to-private and private-to-private buyouts. Panel B shows results from matched secondary buyouts and first-time private-to-private buyouts. Industry and size match is performed based on the target firm's Fama-French 10 industry classification and total assets at one year prior to the buyout. Buyout year and industry match is performed based on the year of buyout completion and the targets' industry classification. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is performed for the median difference between secondary and first-time buyouts. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The table shows estimated results for the probit regressions and Heckman's selection model using alternative measures of market conditions. All variables, except Industry Market-to-Book and Leveraged loan's spread, are defined in Table 7 . Industry Market-to-Book is the average of market-to-book ratios for a given industry in the year of exit. Leveraged loan's spread is the difference between the high-yield rate minus the six-month LIBOR rate in the year of exit. Marginal effects are reported for probit regressions. The last two columns of the Panel B: Cross-participation matrix 3 i G r o u p B a n k o f S c o t l a n d L l o y d s T S B B a n k B a r c l a y s P r i v a t e E q u i t y C l o s e B r o t h e r s P r i v a t e E q u i t y G r a p h i t e C a p i t a l B r i d g e p o i n t C a p i t a l B l a c k s t o n e G r o u p D u k e S t r e e t C a p i t a l A l c h e m y P a r t n e r s A p a x p a r t n e r s G r e s h a m H g C a p i t a l A B N A m r o E l e c t r a P a r t n e r s P h o e n i x P r i v a t e E q u i t y H e r m e s P r i v a t e E q u i t y L e g a l & G e n e r a l V e n t u r e s P P M V e n t u r e s C a n d o v e r P a r t n e r s C a r l y l e G r o u p C h a r t e r h o u s e C a p i t a all the immediate, as well as ultimate, holding companies, both before and after the buyout year. The buyout year and buyout type provided by Zephyr are also cross-checked during this step. An incorrectly categorized secondary buyout is then dropped from the sample. The purpose of finding holding companies is to collect consolidated statements. In a typical LBO, a shell company is created as the target firm's parent. After the buyout, all proceeds from the target firms' subsidiaries are then consolidated under the new parent company. In order to accurately compare the target firms' operating performance before and after the buyout, consolidated statements must be used. In addition, in a secondary buyout, a new holding company is created on top of the previous acquisition vehicle. Therefore, holding companies both before and after the buyout need to be identified. Once all holding companies are identified, I use the names of the parent companies to collect their annual financial filings. In LBO transactions, name changes are also common. Therefore, I also trace the parent companies' name changes to ensure a correct parent-subsidiary matching. Acquisitions and divestitures are common for private equity firms' portfolio companies. In some cases, the secondary-buyout target and its subsidiaries are acquired as a stand-alone unit. In other cases, secondary buyouts are add-on acquisitions for the buyers' exiting portfolio companies. Although these two scenarios might indicate differences in the buyers' strategies, directly comparing accounting information gathered from the parent companies' consolidated financial reports can be problematic when secondary buyouts are add-on acquisitions for the buyers exiting portfolio companies. Therefore, my secondary-buyout sample is divided to 'Same subsidiary' and 'Different subsidiaries' based on subsidiary changes in a one-year window centered on the buyout year. Subsidiary changes are all identified from the target firms' and their parent companies' consolidated statements. All consolidated statements report undertaking subsidiaries as well as acquisitions made during the fiscal year. If the targets' subsidiaries are exactly the same from one year before the buyout to one year after, the target falls under 'Same subsidiaries' group. The total number of 46 firms from the 'Different subsidiaries' are removed from the analyses of efficiency gains. These firms are added back to the sample in all other tests. However, for completeness, For completeness, Table 10 shows the median percentage changes and the industry-adjusted median percentage changes in operating performance from year i to year j for secondary-buyout targets in the 'Different subsidiaries' sample. The full sample of 140 firms is divided to 'Same subsidiary' and 'Different subsidiaries' based on subsidiary changes in a one-year window centered on the buyout year. The 'Different subsidiaries' group contains firms whose undertaking subsidiaries changed during the one-year event window and consequently are excluded from Table 5 and Table 6 . All variables are defined in Table 5 . Twotailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are performed to test whether the percentage changes are significantly different from zero. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
